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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the Coase theorem in a non cooperative
game framework. In particular, we explore the robustness of the Coase
theorem with respect to the ￿nal distribution of alienable property rights
which constitutes, as far as we know, a less cultivated ￿eld of research.
In our framework, in order to reach e¢ ciency, agents have to stipulate
binding contracts. In the analysis, we distinguish between permanent and
temporary contracts showing the di⁄erent implication of the two kinds of
contracts with respect to the ￿nal attribution of individual rights. More
precisely, we show that, with temporary binding contracts and under par-
ticular assumptions, the ￿nal attribution if individual rights does not con-
verge.
Keywords: Coase theorem, binding contracts, side payments.
JEL classi￿cation codes: C7, D6.
1 Introduction
The Coase Theorem1, as it is well known, asserts that in absence of transaction
costs, the ￿nal outcome of bargaining (i.e., the resource allocation among indi-
viduals) does not depend on the initial distribution of rights or liability rules2.
As noted about a decade ago by Usher (1998), e¢ ciency may be achieved not
only with a well de￿ned assignment of initial property rights (or liability rules),
but also in situations in which property rights are insecure and/or ill-de￿ned.
1See Coase (1960, 1988). It was Stigler (1966, p.113) the ￿rst scholar introducing the label
"Coase Theorem".
2For a standard de￿nition of the Coase theorem see, among others, Mueller (2003, p. 28)
and Myles (1995, p. 319).
1This aspect of the Coase theorem is full analyzed - among others - in Schmitz
(2001), and more recently by Robson-Skaperdas (2008)3.
In this work, we explore the robustness of the Coase theorem with respect
to the ￿nal distribution of property rights which constitutes, as far as we know,
a less cultivated ￿eld of research.
The analysis is made in a non-cooperative game setting. Indeed, we follow
an important branch of literature 4 according to which individual rights may be
represented in a non-cooperative game. That is, we associate to each assignment
of individual rights a set of permissible strategies that individuals can play. More
precisely, in our framework, each assignment of property rights is associated to
a non-cooperative game in pure strategies.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume the existence of two di⁄erent right
regimes to which correspond two di⁄erent non-cooperative games5.
Under this two-games framework, we explore the possibility that individual
rights (or liability rules) are alienable. In other terms, we consider situations
in which the assignment of property rights is exchangeable, by assuming the
possibility of switching from a certain game to another one.
We will see that in our framework, in order to reach e¢ ciency, agents have to
stipulate binding contracts. In the analysis we distinguish between permanent
and temporary contracts showing (section 4) the di⁄erence of the two kinds
of contracts with respect to the ￿nal attribution of individual rights. More
precisely, we will show that, with temporary contracts and under particular
assumptions, the right regime switch may be endless. Section 4 also shows the
necessary conditions on individual preferences in order to obtain such result.
An other result of the paper (section 4) is that our ￿ndings are robust with
respect to the introduction of side payments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we brie￿ y describe
the way in which rights are introduced in economic analysis. In section 3, we
set the economic environment. In section 4, we present the results of the paper.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Rights in economic theory
As it is well known, individual rights play an important role in the Coase theo-
rem. As far as we know, the ￿rst author who introduced rights in economics - at
least in a formal way - was Amartya Sen with his famous liberal paradox (Sen,
1970). Sen￿ s notion of rights was articulated by attributing to each individual
the decisiveness over one pair of social states di⁄erent among them for a feature
concerning the individual himself. This idea is quite simple and intuitive: being
these alternatives di⁄erent only for personal characteristics which refers to the
single individual, the individual himself is entitled to ￿x the social ranking of
3See also Schi⁄ (1995) for an informal de￿nition of uncertain property rights.
4See section 2.
5For example, while in the ￿rst game agent i has the right to pollute, in the other game
the other agent (￿i) has the right to avoid pollution.
2these two alternatives. This ￿rst approach was based on the existence of some
social choice rule which was asked to satisfy individual rights, the Pareto prin-
ciple and an universal domain assumption on individual preferences. Rights are
a sort of constraint that the social choice rule should satisfy. Sen (1970) shows
that such social choice rule does not exist. Always by referring to a social choice
rule, a somewhat more articulated notion of rights was subsequently introduced
by Gibbard in an in￿ uential paper (Gibbard, 1974)6.
Another, and more recent, stream of literature interprets rights in terms
of game forms. The basic idea, in this case, is that rights attribute to the
individual the entitlement of choosing within a set of permissible strategies.
Once rights are established, and consequently the sets of individual admissible
strategies, agents exercise their rights by playing the non-cooperative game in
pure strategies7. In this paper, in order to analyze the Coase theorem, we will
use the game form representation of rights8. We will assume that by choosing
his strategy, the agent is able to ￿x a ￿ feature￿of the social state and thus he is
able to in￿ uence the ￿nal outcome9.
As it is well-known, in the Coase theorem an important ingredient is the
initial assignment of rights or liability rules (e.g. the right to pollute, to make
noise, etc.). In our work, to each initial assignment of rights it corresponds a
non-cooperative game with di⁄erent strategies. For example, to the right to
pollute for a ￿rm it corresponds a set of available strategies (say game A) that
are di⁄erent in the event the ￿rm has no right to pollute (say game B). At
the same time, the other ￿rm damaged from pollution has di⁄erent strategies
according to the initial assignment of pollution right (game A and B).
Furthermore, we explore the possibility that rights are alienable. In other
terms, we consider situations in witch the assignment of individual rights (liabil-
ity rules) are exchangeable. The agents may ￿ bargain￿among them by switching
from a certain assignment of individual rights to another, that is by switching
from a game to another10.
6This literature is partially surveyed, among others, by Sen himself (1976), Suzumura
(1983) and Wriglesworth (1985).
7This is, roughly speaking, the essence of game form articulation of individual rights. See,
among others Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura (1992). Sen (1992) [contains] a rejoinder to
the game form articulation of individual rights.
8In other terms, within a particular game, we assume that agents may exercise their rights
by choosing a strategy among their set of available strategies.
9We remind the reader that this assumption is not generally true in the realm of game form
articulation of individual rights. A di⁄erent notion refers to concept of ￿ e⁄ectivity function￿
(see, among others, Peleg 1998).
10Since we analyze the Coase theorem, a standard assumption we make is that e¢ ciency
is the implicit goal of individuals. If, on the contrary, rights concern purely private matters,
such as in Sen￿ s Liberal Paradox, then it is questionable that social e¢ ciency represents still
a desideratum. See, e.g., Sen (1983, 1995); Suzumura (1996).
33 The economic environment
Let N = f1;2g be the set of economic actors11 with generic element i = 1;2.
Each actor has a set of strategies that depend on the liability or responsibility
rules (i.e., the right to emit pollution, to make noise, and so on). For simplicity
we consider two di⁄erent attributions of individual rights, that we label by
h 2 fA;Bg. Each right attribution o⁄ers di⁄erent possibilities of actions to
economic agents: in particular, we suppose that it is possible to associate to
each right attribution rule a set of strategies to the individuals. We associate







Given the initial attribution of rights (and thus of strategies), agents play a
non-cooperative game in pure strategies.
Furthermore, we introduce a payo⁄ function u which maps the combination
of individual strategies ￿h
1 ￿ ￿h
2 into the set of individual payo⁄s
u : ￿h
1 ￿ ￿h
2 ! ￿ = f￿1;￿2g
The payo⁄ of each individual is therefore a function of the emerging couple




where s is the generic strategy played by agent i in game (right regime) h, while
t is the generic strategy played by the other agent, say ￿i, in the same game.
In our framework, a bargain is de￿ned as a decision among individuals which
"exchanges" (transfers) their rigths or liability rules. This decision will a⁄ect
the individual set of strategies (the environment) and therefore their way to
operate.
In our setting, an exchange of individual rights is a "switch" from right
regime A (resp. B) to B (resp. A). In the following we will call the result of
the bargain process a switch right regime (SRR).
We have now the basic ingredients that we will use to show our results.
4 Results
The results we prove in this section are based on six assumptions and two
de￿nitions that we present and discuss:
￿ Assumption 1. Given a right attribution, agents have the possibility to
switch to the other one.
￿ Assumption 2. There are no transaction costs.
￿ Assumption 3. There are no side payments.
11Dixit and Olson (2000) show the non-validity of the Coase theorem when the number of
actors is su¢ ciently high, because of free-riding behavior.
4￿ Assumption 4. In absence of binding contracts, given a right attribution
h 2 fA;Bg, each agent acts according to individual rationality, that is by
choosing (whether exists) his/her dominant strategy.
￿ Assumption 5. The game may be played for an inde￿nite number of
times. Agents discount future payo⁄s at rate ￿ > 0.
Assumption 1 relies on the literature interpreting individual right as a non-
cooperative game (see section 2). Accordingly, a change of individual rights
implies a change of the game played.
Assumption 2 is standard in the Coase theorem literature. The issue whether
the presence of transaction costs a⁄ects the robustness of Coase theorem was
analyzed, among others, by Anderlini and Felli (2001, 2006).
Assumption 3 is made for the sake of simplicity. Nevertheless, in sub-section
4.2 we relax assumption 3 and analyze situations in which side payments are
allowed.
Assumption 4 and 5 are quite standard in the literature.
About binding contracts12, we analyze two cases according to the duration
of the contract. In particular, we distinguish between permanent and temporary
binding contracts.
￿ De￿nition 1. With a permanent binding contract agents may switch right
regime and are obliged to play forever the strategy they have stipulated.
￿ De￿nition 2. With a temporary binding contract agents may switch right
regime and are obliged to play the strategy they have stipulated for a ￿nite
number of moves.
￿ Assumption 6. Temporary binding contract obliges agents only for a
single move and can be stipulated more than one time.
As far as we know, in the literature, temporary binding contract is a less culti-
vated ￿eld: The issue of contract duration has been mainly analyzed, in contract
theory, with reference to relationship-speci￿c investment (Joskow, 1987).
Regarding the robustness of the Coase theorem, in this paper when we say
that it does not hold, we refer to the fact that agents are no able to attain the
most e¢ cient outcome.
We are now ready to state the main result of the paper.
Proposition 1
Given N = f1;2g and given two di⁄erent attributions of individual rights, A
and B, there exists a payo⁄ function u￿ : ￿h
1 ￿ ￿h
2 ! ￿￿ = f￿￿
1;￿￿
2g, such that:
(i). If there are no binding contracts the Coase theorem does not hold.
(ii). If there are permanent binding contracts the Coase theorem holds.
12In the cooperative games framework, the role of binding contracts is analyzed by Bernholz
(1997, 1999).
5(iii). If there are temporary binding contracts the Coase theorem holds. But
there is no convergent ￿nal allocation of property rights in the sense that agents
have an incentive to continuously switch from one right attribution to the other.
Proof:





11 (4, 2) (5, 1)
￿A
12 (1, 8) (3, 7)





11 (2, 4) (8, 1)
￿B
12 (1, 5) (7, 3)
Table 2: Matrix payo⁄s in right regime B.
It can be easily checked that in A agent 1￿ s dominant strategy is ￿A
11 and
that agent 2￿ s dominant strategy is ￿A
21 and that in B, 1￿ s dominant strategy is
￿B
11 and that 2￿ s dominant strategy is ￿B
21. Therefore, in game A there is one
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (￿A
11, ￿A
21) corresponding to the payo⁄ (4,
2); in the symmetric game B there is one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
(￿B
11, ￿B
21) corresponding to the payo⁄ (2, 4).
Let￿ s start, without loss of generality, with the regime A. Now, it can be
seen that there is a combination of strategies in B, (￿B
12;￿B
22) with an associated
payo⁄ higher for everyone (7, 3).
According to Assumption 1, agents may switch to game B without any
transaction cost (Assumption 2). However, if there are no binding contracts,
given Assumption 4 agent 1 knows that after the switch, agent 2 will play
his/her dominant strategy ￿B
21. Therefore, 1￿ s payo⁄ will be 2 which is lower
than his/her actual payo⁄(4). Further, given Assumption 3, agents are not able
to reach the outcome (3,7), since there are no side payments. This prove part
(i) of Proposition 1.
If there are permanent binding contracts, according to Assumption 1, agents
may switch to game B without any transaction cost (Assumption 2). Further,
thanks to binding contracts they are able to oblige themselves in playing forever
the strategies (￿B
12;￿B
22) which assure a Pareto improvement. This prove part
(ii) of Proposition 1.
If there are temporary binding contracts, by Assumptions 1 and 2, agents
may switch to game B without any transaction cost. If they stipulate a tem-
porary binding contract they will earn initially a payo⁄ (7, 3). Then, after this
single move, by Assumption 4, they will end up in the Nash equilibrium of game
B with a new payo⁄ (2,4). However this situation is harmful for agent 1 who
6would lose 5. Therefore in order to reduce such loss, agent 1 will propose a new
temporary binding contract in order to switch in game A in (￿A
12;￿A
22) which as-
sures to each player a higher payo⁄ (7, 3) with respect to the Nash equilibrium
in B. However we note that (￿A
12;￿A
22) is not a Nash equilibrium and, therefore,
according to our previous reasoning they will switch to (￿B
12;￿B
22), and so on.
We note also that is rational for each agent to prefer this ￿continuous switch￿
to the initial Nash equilibrium. Indeed, without stipulating contracts, agent 1






(1 + ￿)2 +
4
(1 + ￿)3 + :::
which is lower (for every ￿ > 0) than the discounted payo⁄ agent 1 would earn






(1 + ￿)2 +
3
(1 + ￿)3 + :::
It can be easily checked that the same holds also for agent 2. This proves
the second part of (iii).
In order to prove the ￿rst part of (iii), i.e. the fact that the Coase theorem
holds with temporary binding contracts, we note that with temporary binding
contracts agents will shift ￿continuously￿from a payo⁄ (3, 7) to a payo⁄ (7, 3)
which are, both of them, e¢ cient payo⁄s. k
4.1 Individual preferences
Probably the ￿rst reaction to Proposition 1 is to say that it is not generally
true: more precisely, with temporary binding contracts we have a ￿ continuous￿
switch of property rights because of the particular values of individual payo⁄s.
This consideration is obviously correct: our result is not generally true but
holds only in some circumstances. In particular we showed in the proof of the
proposition that the ￿trick￿by which we obtained this switch depends on the
fact that there is an outcome in game A such that everyone prefers it to the
Nash equilibrium of game B and, symmetrically, there exists an outcome in B
such that every agent prefers it to the Nash equilibrium in game A. We can
show that a necessary condition on individual preferences in order to have a no
stable allocation of ￿nal rights under temporary binding contracts is that there
are at least two externalities/spillovers one for each game and one for each
agent. In other terms, it has to exist an agent i having an externality/spillover
in right regime A and the other agent (￿i) having an externality/spillover in
right regime B.
In order to show this result, we state the following de￿nition:














7This implies that for agent i there are no externalities if his payo⁄ is not
altered by the decision of the other agent, and therefore, i may neglect the
decisions of the other agent.
Proposition 2
Given N = f1;2g and given two di⁄erent attributions of individual rights,
A and B, under assumptions A1-A6, a necessary condition in order to have a
no stable allocation of ￿nal rights in presence of temporary binding contracts
is that player i has an externality/spillover in game A and player (￿i) has an
externality/spillover in game B.
Proof:
For notational convenience, the Nash equilibrium in game h will be denoted
by NEh. In order to have a no convergent allocation of ￿nal rights, it is necessary
that there is a combination of strategies in game A, that we denote (a) with a
little abuse of notation13, such that:
￿l(a) > ￿l(NEB) 8l 2 N (1)
and a combination of strategies in B, say (b), such that:
￿l(b) > ￿l(NEA) 8l 2 N (2)
Now assume, by contradiction, that i has has no externalities. The absence
of externalities for i implies that there is no combination of strategies which
assures to him a higher payo⁄ than the Nash equilibrium, i.e. ￿i(NEB) ￿ ￿i(b)
and ￿i(NEA) ￿ ￿i(b). Combining with equation (2), it results: ￿i(NEB) ￿
￿i(b) > ￿i(NEA) ￿ ￿i(a) which contradicts equation (1). Therefore i has at
least one externality (the same arguments also holds for ￿i).
In order to show that both externalities have to lie in di⁄erent games, sup-
pose, by contradiction, that they both are in the same game, without loss of
generality, game B. Now, if in game A there are no externalities, then we
have ￿l(NEA) ￿ ￿l(a) 8l 2 N, which implies, by equations (1) and (2),
￿l(b) > ￿l(NEA) ￿ ￿l(a) > ￿l(NEB) 8l 2 N. However in this case we
haven￿ t got an endless switch, since individuals will always have interest to
choose b. Indeed, assume that for some reason they are in game B. They have
no incentive to exchange their rights and to switch to game A, since b is the
best result for all. On the other hand, if they are in game A, they will have an
incentive to switch in B and, through a binding contract, to choose b. k
In order to have a better understanding of Proposition 2, we present the
following numerical example.
Example 1. Let￿ s consider the following payo⁄s in Game A and B.








11 (4, 2) (4, 1)
￿A
12 (3, 8) (3, 2)





11 (2, 4) (8, 3)
￿B
12 (1, 4) (2, 3)
Table 4: Matrix payo⁄s in right regime B.
It can be easily checked that game A exhibits a Nash equilibrium with an
associated payo⁄ (4, 2) that game B exhibits a (pure strategies) Nash equilib-
rium with an associated payo⁄ (2, 4), that there an outcome in A such that
everyone prefers it to the Nash equilibrium in B (and simmetrically in B), and
that agent 1 in game A has not any externality and so agent 2 in game B.
4.2 Side payments
In this section, we relax Assumption 3 and we analyze situations in which side
payments are allowed. One could argue that the introduction of side payments
may be su¢ cient to avoid the ￿non-convergence￿of ￿nal rights. In other words,
it could be argued that with side payments, individuals would not have the ne-
cessity to switch from a right regime to another, but simply may ￿nd a proper
amount of payo⁄ transfers such that the e¢ cient outcome (which is not a Nash
equilibrium of the game without side payments) may become the new Nash
equilibrium of the game. In this section, we show that the introduction of side
payments cannot be considered a satisfactory solution to the problem of attri-
bution of ￿nal rights. In other terms, in what follows Assumption 3* replaces
Assumption 3.
￿ Assumption 3*. Side-payments are allowed.
Given Assumption 3*, we may state the following result.
Proposition 3 Given N = f1;2g, and two di⁄erent attributions of individ-
ual rights, A and B, and given Assumptions 2 and 3* then there exists a payo⁄
function u￿ : ￿h
1 ￿ ￿h
2 ! ￿￿ = f￿￿
1;￿￿
2g, such that the Coase theorem does not
hold, i.e. individuals are not able to reach the e¢ cient outcome.
Proof:
Suppose the payo⁄s the players receive in A and B are the following:
In order to show the result and to avoid the introduction of further notation,





11 (3, 7) (0, 8)
￿A
12 (8, 1.5) (4, 2)





11 (7, 3) (1.5, 8)
￿B
12 (8, 0) (2, 4)
Table 6: Matrix payo⁄s in right regime B.
1)14. Let￿ s consider, without loss of generality, game A (same argumentation
holds for game B): it can be easily checked that game A has a Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies with the associated payo⁄(4, 2). In order to reach the outcome
with the greater total payo⁄ (3, 7), agent 2 has the incentive to o⁄er a payment
of 5 + " to agent 1 contingent on the agent 1 playing ￿A






11 (8+", 2-") (5+", 3-")
￿A
12 (8, 1.5) (4, 2)
Table 7: Matrix payo⁄s in right regime A.
At this point, in order to avoid that agents 2 deviates, agent 1 has the
interest to o⁄er any payment of at least 1+" to agent 2 contingent on the agent
2 playing ￿A
21. The matrix payo⁄s now becomes:
Now, it can be easily seen that (￿A
11, ￿A
21) is the new Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies and it also the e¢ cient outcome.
However, we have to note that if agent 2 o⁄ers any payments of at least 5+"
to agent 1 contingent on the agent 1 playing ￿A
11, it is not interest of agent 1
to o⁄er 1 + " to agent 2 contingent on the agent 2 playing ￿A
21. Agent 1 can
do better. Indeed, suppose that agent 1 o⁄ers to agent 2 the amount 0:5 + "
contingent on agent 2 plays ￿A
21 and 0.5 contingent agent 1 himself plays ￿A
11.
Therefore the new matrix payo⁄s becomes:
With these associated side payments, game A has a new Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies (￿A
12, ￿A
21) which assures to agent 1 a greater payo⁄, and which is
not the most e¢ cient outcome, since the total payo⁄ is lower than (￿A
11, ￿A
21).k
The reason for which side payments cannot be considered a general solution
to reach the e¢ cient outcome is clearly identi￿ed by Jackson and Wilkie (2005,
p. 546): ￿Players can use transfers to try to ensure that the other players inter-
nalize externalities. However, they can also use transfers to try to manipulate






11 (7, 3) (5+", 3-")
￿A
12 (7-", 2.5+") (4, 2)





11 (7, 3) (4.5, 3.5)
￿A
12 (7.5-", 2+") (4, 2)
Table 9: Matrix payo⁄s in right regime A.
other players￿behaviour more generally. Sometimes, these objectives are at
odds with each other, and then it is impossible to support e¢ cient outcomes in
equilibrium.￿
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze the robustness of the Coase theorem in a non-cooperative
game framework, and in cases in which it is possible to exchange the conferment
of individual rights (or liability rules).
We perform the analysis by using two games each one corresponding to a
di⁄erent right regime. Agents can bargain their rights at zero transaction costs.
An important feature is that agents decide to switch from a right regime to the
other if there is, in the other right regime, a social state which constitutes a
Pareto improvement. Without binding contracts, agents behave according to
individual rationality, i.e. they always choose their dominant strategies.
We show that, in presence of temporary contracts, with at least two agents,
it is possible to have an endless bargain of individual rights. This result arises
from the fact that it is possible to ￿nd an utility function such that, for every
game, the Nash equilibrium is Pareto dominated by an outcome of the other
game.
Another result of our work is that a necessary condition in order to have an
endless bargain is the existence of an agent i with an externality in the ￿rst right
regime, and the other agent (￿i) with an externality in the other right regime.
In other terms, it is necessary that there are two externalities/spillovers, one for
each game and one for each agent.
The last result we ￿nd is that, under conditions shown in the paper, the
introduction of side payments cannot avoid the endless bargain.
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